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 IN PRAISE OF WHIG LAWYERING: 
A COMMENTARY ON ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
AS LAWYER—AND POLITICIAN 
JOSEPH A. RANNEY*
This essay engages an important facet of Professor Mark E. Steiner’s 
valuable look at Abraham Lincoln as a lawyer.
 
1  This is, specifically, 
Lincoln’s view that “reverence for the laws [needed] to become the 
‘political religion of the nation,’”2 even though parts of the law—for 
example, the law of slavery—were regarded by many as unjust.  Steiner 
characterizes this as a Whiggish view of the law, one that went hand in 
hand with the view held by Lincoln and his fellow Whigs that collective 
private and state action was necessary to foster economic growth.3  
Steiner appears to admire Whig lawyering in many respects, but 
suggests that it came up short in the legal crisis over slavery.4
Professor Steiner discusses at length the Mateson case,
 
5
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 where 
Abraham Lincoln represented a Kentucky slaveowner making an 
unsuccessful attempt to hold in bondage Jane, a slave whom the owner 
had domiciled in the free state of Illinois.  Lincoln has been criticized for 
taking the side of slavery in the case, but Steiner defends (or at least 
half-defends) Lincoln, by noting that the Whig lawyering ethic allowed 
Lincoln’s action.  In the mid-nineteenth century, legal ethics were in an 
inchoate, formative stage.  Jurist Timothy Hoffman and the legal wing 
of the abolitionist movement, led by Salmon Chase and James Birney 
and including Lincoln’s law partner William Herndon among its 
1. MARK E. STEINER, AN HONEST CALLING: THE LAW PRACTICE OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN (2006). 
2. Id. at 58. 
3. Id. at 3. 
4. Id. at 103–36. 
5. In re Jane, A Woman of Color, 5 W.L.J. 202 (1848); STEINER, supra note 1, at 103–36.  
General Mateson’s name is spelled variously: “Matson” in STEINER, supra note 1; “Mateson” 
in the case itself, 5 W.L.J. 202; and, in another place, “Mattison,” see STEINER, supra note 1, 
at 124 (in discussing whether Mateson paid Lincoln for his work, noting that Abraham 
Lincoln’s father sent a letter to his son stating that he had tried to sell a note from 
“Mattison”). 
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members, contended that lawyers could not ethically take cases in which 
they would have to work against their personal beliefs.  By contrast, 
Whig lawyers believed that a lawyer’s duty to uphold the legal system 
included an obligation to assist persons in need of legal assistance 
regardless of the morality of their position.6  Steiner notes that the Whig 
view ultimately prevailed and is now a cornerstone of modern legal 
ethics and that it justified Lincoln’s representation of Mateson.7  But 
Steiner concludes that Lincoln’s decision to represent Mateson “shows 
the corrupting influence of a legal ethic that minimized moral 
responsibility.”8
I respectfully dissent from this view.  I will briefly discuss the 
Mateson case and give two other examples from Lincoln’s life and times 
that show that Whig lawyering, far from being an obstacle to the cause 
of freedom, in fact turned out to be an asset. 
 
I.  SLAVE TRANSIT CASES 
The Mateson case addressed one of two great legal issues that 
opponents of slavery confronted: namely, under what circumstances 
does a slave who sets foot on free soil become free?  Professor Steiner 
points out that, at the time Mateson was decided, the prevailing rule was 
that slaves in transit through free territory did not become free, but 
slaves who remained on free soil for a significant period of time—often 
expressed in terms of domicile—became free.9  Paul Finkleman has 
pointed out that starting in the 1830s, as the South became increasingly 
militant in its efforts to protect and extend slavery, many Northern 
courts reacted by liberalizing the concept of domicile in transit cases.  
Put another way, the early nineteenth-century presumption held by 
most Northern courts and juries, that in cases of doubt the burden was 
on black Americans to prove they were free, gave way to a tacit 
presumption in favor of freedom and a shifting of the burden of proof to 
the slaveholder.10
In the Mateson case, Lincoln did the best he could to persuade the 
court that Jane fell on the “transit” rather than the “domicile” side of 
 
 
6. STEINER, supra note 1, at 136. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 115–18. 
10. See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, 
AND COMITY (1981); see also Kinney v. Cook, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 231 (1841); Hone v. Ammons, 
14 Ill. 29 (1852); Rodney v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 19 Ill. 42 (1857). 
2010] IN PRAISE OF WHIG LAWYERING 1327 
 
the line between slavery and freedom.11  It is important to note that 
Mateson is the first published case in which members of the Illinois 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to limit the scope of the transit 
rule.12
II.  THE BOOTH CASES 
  Lincoln thus provided a real service to the antislavery cause, even 
if this was no part of his intent.  His thorough presentation of Mateson’s 
position, particularly his lucid exposition of the dichotomy between 
transit and domicile, forced the Illinois Supreme Court justices who 
heard the case to craft a decision against slavery that was more carefully 
reasoned and solid than it might have been if a less able advocate had 
represented Mateson.  Thus, by being true to Whig lawyering, Lincoln 
indirectly helped forge another tool for the fight against slavery. 
The second great legal issue that opponents of slavery confronted 
was the validity of federal laws for the return of fugitive slaves to their 
owners.13  Antislavery lawyers attacked such laws on a variety of 
grounds, mainly that the laws could not be enforced because they did 
not include any enforcement mechanisms, that they unconstitutionally 
denied fugitives the right to a jury trial, and that they violated equal-
protection principles by paying federal magistrates more in cases where 
they sent fugitives back into slavery than in cases where they ruled for 
freedom.14  The Supreme Court rejected such attacks in Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania15 and Jones v. Van Zandt.16
 
11. STEINER, supra note 1, at 119. 
  The movement then tried its 
luck in Northern state courts, which it hoped would be more 
sympathetic, but its efforts ran afoul of what we might call judicial 
Whiggism.  In Sims’ Case, Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw 
explained that whatever his personal views of the fugitive slave laws’ 
constitutionality might be, he was obligated to defer to the Supreme 
12. Cf. Willard v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 461 (1843) (holding that a slave who escaped 
from her Louisiana master while the two traveled through Illinois did not thereby gain 
freedom).  
13. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one 
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on 
Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”); Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 
1 Stat. 302; Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
14. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 150–54, 161–65 (1975).  
15. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  
16. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847). 
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Court’s decisions in the Prigg and Van Zandt cases.17  Other states 
followed suit.18
With one exception: Wisconsin.  In 1852, a Missouri slave, Joshua 
Glover, escaped from his master and made his way to Wisconsin.  Two 
years later, his master found Glover and captured him with help from 
U.S. marshals.  Sherman Booth, an abolitionist leader, thereupon 
organized a march on the Milwaukee jail where Glover was being held.  
The mob forcibly freed Glover, who escaped to Canada and permanent 
freedom.  Booth was arrested for violation of the fugitive slave laws and 
retained a young abolitionist lawyer, Byron Paine, to apply to Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Justice Abram Smith for a writ of habeas corpus.
 
19  
Paine employed the traditional arguments used against fugitive slave 
laws but added a new one: that state supreme courts were coequals with 
the federal Supreme Court and did not have to defer to its decisions.20  
Smith shocked Wisconsin and the nation by agreeing with Paine and 
ordering Booth’s release; his decision was later upheld by his colleagues 
on the court.21
If the supreme law of the land, the constitution of the 
United States . . . is to give way to elementary criticisms 
and decisions of the State authorities, it is not difficult to 
forsee most grave and disastrous results. . . . And the 
system which, with all its inherited evils and all its own 
sins, is still the political hope of all mankind, may be led 
step by step into dissension, disruption and civil warfare, 
to gratify the consciences of those who trusting nothing 
to concession, nothing to time, nothing to Providence, 
would destroy everything imperfect, in a world in which 
nothing is perfect.
  The Wisconsin judges clearly were not judicial Whigs, 
but they sparked an impassioned defense of Whiggism, most notably 
this comment by future Wisconsin Chief Justice Edward Ryan: 
22
 
17. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285 (1851).  
 
18. See Ex parte Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859); see also Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. 
Deacon, 5 Serg. & Rawle 63 (Pa. 1819); COVER, supra note 14, at 163, 169. 
19. See A.J. Beitzinger, Federal Law Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 41 MARQ. L. 
REV. 7 (1957); David Atwood & H. Rublee, Explanation, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 17, 1854, at 2. 
20. Byron Paine, Argument (May 29, 1854), in SLAVERY, RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM, 1700–1872: FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS 347 (Paul 
Finkelman ed., 1988). 
21. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 14, 25, 34, 43–47 (1854), rev’d sub nom., Ableman v. Booth, 62 
U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).  
22. E.G. Ryan, Ableman v. Booth, WKLY. ARGUS AND DEMOCRAT (Madison, Wis.), 
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In 1859, newly appointed Chief Justice Luther S. Dixon echoed 
Ryan’s sentiments, warning that states-rights advocates would “place it 
in the power of any one state, beyond all peaceful remedy, to arrest the 
execution of the laws of the entire Union, and to break down and 
destroy at pleasure every barrier created and right given by the 
constitution.”23  Dixon’s statement nearly cost him reelection, but it also 
caused a number of abolitionists to reconsider whether it was better to 
work within the political system than to defy it, and Dixon effectively 
ended Wisconsin’s states-rights controversy over slavery.24  Lincoln 
expressed similar sentiments in response to the Dred Scott decision,25 
although he added a caveat that because the decision was not 
unanimous, was arguably partisan, and established a new doctrine, it 
was perhaps not “factious [or] revolutionary, to not acquiesce in it as a 
precedent.”26  History vindicated Whig lawyering in this case: within a 
decade, all black Americans were citizens, and it was acknowledged, 
even in the South, that they had at least minimal rights which whites 
were bound to respect.27
III.  LINCOLN AND THE DEMISE OF SLAVERY 
 
Lincoln’s Whig lawyering served the cause of freedom well during 
the Civil War.  Lincoln has sometimes been criticized for not freeing all 
the slaves at the beginning of the war.  His decision not to do so was 
based in part on a close calculation of the political realities of the time: if 
he had tried to do so, Kentucky and other Union border states very 
likely would have seceded, and, as Lincoln recognized, to lose those 
states was effectively to lose the war.28
 
June 29, 1854, at 2. 
  But Lincoln’s decision seems 
23. Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 517, 532 (1859). 
24. Joseph A. Ranney, “Suffering the Agonies of Their Righteousness”: The Rise and Fall 
of the States Rights Movement in Wisconsin, 1854–1861, 75 WIS. MAG. HIST. 83, 104–11 
(1992). 
25. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
26. Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois (June 
26, 1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832–1858, at 393 (Don E. 
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see generally JOSEPH A. RANNEY, IN THE WAKE OF 
SLAVERY: CIVIL WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN LAW 
(2006).  
28. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 299–300 (1995); see generally E. MERTON 
COULTER, THE CIVIL WAR AND READJUSTMENT IN KENTUCKY (1926). This reality is 
discussed in the Klement Lecture that forms part of this symposium.  See Jerrica A. Giles & 
Allen C. Guelzo, Colonel Utley’s Emancipation—Or, How Lincoln Offered to Buy a Slave, 93 
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also partly to have been a product of his Whiggish instincts, which led 
him to conclude that in order to endure, emancipation must have a solid 
legal foundation. 
The Whiggish seed that germinated into emancipation was planted 
by Benjamin Butler, a Union general whose legal skills proved to exceed 
his military skills.  Butler, while commanding a Union fort near Norfolk 
in March 1862, argued that slaves who escaped into the Union lines 
should be denied as a war resource to the Confederacy by being treated 
as contraband of war and emancipated.  When other Union generals 
attempted to emancipate slaves directly, Lincoln reprimanded them and 
rescinded their orders.  But, as to Butler, the only one of the generals 
who framed an emancipation argument within the framework of the law 
as it was rather than the law as he wished it to be, Lincoln let the order 
stand.29
The Emancipation Proclamation, which some have praised as a 
mighty blow for racial justice and others have damned as a fainthearted 
response to justice’s call, is in fact a refined product of Whig lawyering.  
Lincoln went to great pains to portray the proclamation as an act of 
military necessity, a limited measure that was the furthest he could go 
under his Article II powers as commander in chief of United States 
military forces.  In order to make this legal foundation as solid as 
possible, he limited the proclamation’s effect to areas still in rebellion 
and made clear that it did not apply in loyal slave states or areas of the 
South then under the control of Union forces.
 
30
As critics have pointed out, this meant that the proclamation applied 
only to areas in which it could not be enforced.
 
31
 
MARQ. L . REV. 1263 (2010). 
  But legally Lincoln 
could not do otherwise.  He had no power to abolish slavery in loyal 
areas: that could be done only by a constitutional amendment.  It should 
be remembered that Lincoln actively encouraged enactment of an 
amendment abolishing slavery as the Civil War approached its end.  
Most historians believe that he was instrumental in securing 
29. DONALD, supra note 28, at 314–15, 343, 363. 
30. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into 
the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); 2 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: 
THE WAR YEARS 17–18 (1939). 
31. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION 
OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 33–34 (2001). 
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congressional passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in early 1865.32
 
  A 
constitutional amendment was a solid, indeed legally unassailable, 
foundation for emancipation of all slaves.  Lincoln’s decision to take a 
Whiggish rather than a radical approach to emancipation in the end 
ensured that it would be enduring, not a temporary upheaval that might 
have ended with the war. 
 
32. DONALD, supra note 28, at 553–54. 
